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The Saint and the Cynic 
Resentment and Jewishness in Améry, Sloterdijk, and 
Wyschogrod 
Menachem Feuer 
York University 
The constellation of pain, resentment, the body, and time – as they exist in 
the wake of the Enlightenment and in the dawn of a new barbarism - is 
found throughout the work of Jean Améry and Peter Sloterdijk. Both 
thinkers were especially influenced by Nietzsche’s readings of resentment, 
his challenge to the Enlightenment, and his turn to the body as the basis of a 
new kind of thinking which starts with pain, dwells in irreversible time, and 
ends with the possibility of action and joy. While this new thinking is novel 
and appeals to all humankind, the most unexpected points of convergence 
between Améry and Sloterdijk can be found in their particular neo-
Nietzschean articulations of Jewishness: using what Harold Bloom would 
call revision, they both propose a revision of Nietzsche’s reading of Judaism 
as resentment. Améry associates Jewishness with “revolt” while Sloterdijk 
associates what he calls “kynicism” (as opposed to cynicism) with 
Jewishness.1 Intensely aware of the mortal blows that have been dealt to the 
Enlightenment, philosophy, and modernity as well as to the human body 
during the Holocaust, Améry and Sloterdijk both address – either directly or 
indirectly – the meaning of cynicism in relation to Jewishness, in particular, 
and the modern condition, in general.  
How does cynicism offer modern man the greatest challenge and the 
most important opportunity? Améry’s attitude toward cynicism is dual. In 
At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor at Auschwitz and its Realities, 
Améry suggests taking action, which is in solidarity with other Jews, in 
response to cynicism; but in his book, On Aging he does not. For the aging 
there is neither action nor solidarity; there is only pain, the body, and time. 
One can only reflect on one’s body in pain as it moves toward death (in 
relation to which the subject marks time). While the former book challenges 
cynicism and resentment through action, the latter resigns itself to inaction 
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and resentment. This is the route of the cynic who gives up on ever 
reversing time. 
But one need not take this route. Edith Wyschogrod’s reading of the 
body, pain, and time in terms of the Saint – which she contrasts to a 
Nietzschean reading of resentment - suggests a counterpoint to this cynical 
position. Wyschogrod contrasts what she calls the “affective” relation of the 
Saint-to-the-other to Nietzsche’s “reactive” reading (which, ultimately, is 
cynical and kynical, depending on whether the reading of cynicism is made 
by Améry or Sloterdijk). Wyschogrod fears that what may be lost in the neo-
Nietzschean reading of resentment is the vulnerability of the Saintly body 
which, in its relationship to the other, is exposed to the injury of the other. 
Although Améry focuses in on the vulnerability of the torture victim, 
Wyschogrod’s work on the Saint suggests that, contra Améry, it is more 
important to start with the other’s pain and resentment rather than my own. 
While her critique addresses Nietzsche and challenges Sloterdijk’s claim that 
“kynicism” is the answer to cynicism, one wonders how it would address 
Améry’s call (after Auschwitz) for “revolt.” To address this question, we 
first need to turn to Nietzsche who Améry and Sloterdijk are deeply 
indebted so as to know what is at stake in the tension between the cynic and 
the saint. 
 
Nietzsche: Resentment, the Body, “Medicynicism,” and 
Jewishness 
 For Nietzsche, the appeal to weakness, guilt, and conscience, against which 
he directs most of his work, is rooted in Judaism. In The Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche associates the “slave revolt of morals” and resentment with “the 
Jews.” He likens it to a sickness that needs medication and suggests that not 
simply action but “medicynicism” is the cure. But before he posits the cure, 
Nietzsche gives a diagnosis of the illness which is, in part, based on a false 
understating of the body and its life. Nietzsche worries about the “health” 
threat posed to the “aristocratic warrior caste” by the “priestly aristocracy” 
which, though in a different form, remains, today: “Mankind itself is still ill 
with the effects of this priestly naiveté in medicine.”2 
According to Nietzsche, the “grand politics” that he saw flourishing in 
Europe in the 19th century was based on a form of resentment and a desire 
for vengeance that is historically rooted in the “priestly aristocracy” that 
stretches back to the Second Temple era . The appeal to weakness made at 
during time and was (and, with all its carryoves, such as Christianity and 
Demoncracy, is), in other words, a smoke screen for the true, hidden motive: 
vengeance. Nietzsche doesn’t accept this “grand politics” because he truly 
believes that the “warrior class” is more “healthy’ and deserving of 
historical and political power that those who appeal to slave morality. He 
calls for a revaluation of these values, a return, if you will, to the aristocratic. 
M e n a c h e m  F e u e r  |  9 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.789 
The greatest obstacle to this “return” is “the mob” which, for Nietzsche, took 
over society “through the Jews.”3 In other words, democracy and its concern 
for the other would not be possible without the “Jewish revolt in morals”: it 
started with the Jews, went through Christianity, and was transvalued into 
Enlightenment democracy and made into the law of the land (by way of the 
mobs). For Nietzsche the Jewish Slave Revolt in morals says “no” to life and 
“reacts” to it. In revolt against Master Morality, it “gives birth to new 
values.” But these values, for Nietzsche, must be reversed if “life” is to be 
preserved: 
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes 
creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are 
denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an 
imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant 
affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 
“outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative 
deed.4 
Action, for Nietzsche, is “real” not “imaginary revenge.” The noble 
morality, in contrast, “acts and grows spontaneously,” it “seeks its opposite” 
in order to “affirm itself.”5 The aristocratic warrior is healthy, independent, 
and happy while the “common man,” who draws on and lives according to 
“slave morality,” is “unhappy.” For this reason, Nietzsche sees the pity for 
the “victim” and the common man to be a cloak for jealousy.  
In broad brushstrokes, Nietzsche argues that the “symbol of this 
struggle” is “inscribed in letters legible across all human history”: “Rome 
against Judea, Judea against Rome – there has hitherto been no greater event 
than this struggle, this question, this deadly contradiction. Rome felt the Jew 
to be something like anti-nature itself, its antipodal monstrosity as it were.”6 
In effect, Nietzsche identifies with the Romans, not the Jews. Nietzsche 
finishes his reflections on resentment and the Jews by arguing that the best 
way to understand this tension is through a “physiological” as opposed to a 
“psychological” understanding of the difference between those who adhere 
to a “slave morality” and those who do not: “Indeed, every table of values, 
every ‘thou shalt” known to history or ethnology, requires first a 
physiological investigation and interpretation rather than a psychological 
one.”7 
 Is there any antidote to the sickness Nietzsche associates with Jews, 
slave morality, the common man, or the man of resentment? How does 
Nietzsche address “sickness” through language? Eric Blondel, in his book, 
Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, argues that Nietzsche saw his “shock 
phrases” as an activism devoted to reducing all things to physicality:  
Nietzsche, on the one hand, proposes to apply physiological 
metaphors to culture – we might call him the ‘culture doctor’ – and, 
on the other hand he describes the stomach morally….Nietzsche 
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multiplies certain shock phrases designed reduce thinks to the 
physiological’.8 
These “shock phrases” are aimed at the stomach, so to speak, in order to 
have an affect on the physiological.9 Blondel, citing Nietzsche’s “Daybreak,” 
suggests that Nietzsche turned to a satirical cynicism, in particular, as an 
antidote to Jewishness and slave morality. Nietzsche creates his own word 
to describe his role as a cynic and doctor: 
Nietzsche presents himself as “medicynish” (medicynical), but he is 
much more zynish (cynical) than medizinish (medical) in his insistence on 
the body, even when he speaks of the physiological cause for the ideal…His 
“medicynicsm” is scarcely more than the reverse of the idealism that is a 
moral denigration of the psychosomatic totality of the body and spirit….The 
impact of numerous ‘medicynical’ phrases is less physiological than 
burlesque…The physiology we were expecting, therefore, does not go 
beyond the comical paradoxes of the cynical tradition, from Diogenes to 
Heine, via Montaigne or Swift, without ever attending the scatological 
heights gloriously scaled by Nietzsche’s precursors.10 
Blondel’s reading of Nietzsche’s cynicism suggests that despite 
Nietzsche’s belief that his words and actions actually affects the body and 
health, that Nietzsche “confined himself to burlesque.” For Nietzsche health 
is associated with the comic insult which eschews the past, the victim, etc. in 
the name of joyfully perpetuating itself over against the threat of resentment 
and pity. For Nietzsche the best way to deal with this hatred was to 
rhetorically attack a people (the Jewish people) and not just an idea. And 
this, for Nietzsche, must be done if one doesn’t want to remain an unhappy 
cynic. He’d rather be a happy, cheeky “cynic doctor.” 
The metaphor is straightforward enough: for Nietzsche, cynicism, as 
medicine, saves life from sickness. In the face of life and death, the cynical 
doctor says a Roman yes to life’s affirmation of itself and, in doing so, 
negates the “no” of Judea. That is his “creative deed.” The bottom line is that 
the Nietzschean cynic has no interest in promises, truth, conscience, or 
memory so much as in power and in what Blondel calls cynical burlesque. 
For Nietzsche, who reduces everything to the physiological, in his inversion 
of idealism, the cynic is all body. The “Medicynic” looks to increase his 
body’s physical strength and health by satirically challenging the sources of 
resentment. But he does so by way of revising the past. These types of 
readings of the body and resentment are revised by Sltoerdijk and Améry. 
But although they create something neo-Nietzschean some of their his 
cynical-bodily-egoity remains.  
 
 
M e n a c h e m  F e u e r  |  9 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.789 
Neo-Nietzschean, Take One: Peter Sloterdijk on the 
Cynical and the Kynical  
In The Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk revises Nietzsche’s notion of 
resentment. He articulates what Nietzsche means by the medical cynic 
through the use of a different (yet original term): Kynicism. While he retains 
the notion of the kynic (as opposed to the cynic) as the antidote to idealism 
and the Enlightenment, Sloterdijk inverts Nietzsche’s’ attitude toward the 
past, pain, and Jews. The active “cheeky” agressivity of the cynic is, for 
Sloterdijk, the means to bring the body – which idealism left behind - back 
into the world. Sloterdijk’s most novel move, which speaks to Jean Améry’s 
project, is to claim that there is phenomenon called “Jewish kynicism” and 
that it is, after the Holocaust, definitive. There are many questions about this 
move, however. How does Diogenes – his model for cynicism – and his 
brand of “cheekiness” relate to what Sloterdijk calls Jewish kynicism? And 
how do we reconcile “cheekiness” with the sober response Jews have to 
history after the Holocaust? Jewishness has more akin to humility than to 
cheekiness, and Sloterdijk knows this.  
What this tension discloses is a rift within his concept of cynicism. The 
problem, as we shall see, is Nietzsche. If one is to hold on to Sloterdijk’s 
notion of “cheekiness” (to what Nietzsche would see as an “active” part of 
his brand of Master Morality) - the crux of Diogenes’ kind of cynicism - how 
can one understand the response to pain that is not cheeky, which we see in 
Jean Améry’s response to resentment? Does every response to 
powerlessness and trauma – if it is kynical - have to be cheeky if it is to be 
affective? And what does that say about the Jewish kynical body? Is it, 
because it is so cheeky, invulnerable? And does that make it Cynical rather 
than Saintly? 
 Sloterdijk defines cynicism, at the outset of the book, by way of 
Gottfried Benn who reads cynicism in terms of an “unhappy consciousness” 
that cannot, after being Enlightened, turn back to naïve consciousness; but in 
order to preserve itself, it must hide its unhappiness and act “as if” all is well 
when it knows it’s not.11 To properly diagnose and describe cynicism as a 
problem, Sloterdijk looks into many different sources of cynicism their 
affects. But of those, the most prominent sources of cynicism are the radical 
changes in modern history and mass urbanization. They are, in large part, 
responsible for the spread of cynicism. Decay, death, and radical upheaval 
prompt it to grow. 
In the preface to his book, Sloterdijk reflects on a topic that was quite 
familiar to Nietzsche: the death of philosophy, which of course, gives rise to 
the cynicism of the contemporary thinker: 
For a century now philosophy has been lying on its deathbed, but it 
cannot die…. Its farewell has been torturously drawn out…. Faced 
with its demise, it would like now to be honest and reveals its 
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secret. It confesses: the great themes – God, Universe, Theory, 
Praxis, Subject, Object, Body, Spirt, Meaning, Nothingness – all that 
is nothing. They are nouns for young people, for outsiders, clerics, 
sociologists.12 
After making this confession, Sloterdijk takes the next step which is to define 
the new framework. Echoing Nietzsche, Sloterdijk suggests that it is power: 
“From the corpse of philosophy arose the modern sciences and theories of 
power in the nineteenth century in the form of political science, theory of 
class struggle, technocracy, vitalism, and in every form armed to the teeth…. 
Where Nietzsche....intended to be “dangerously” cold and without illusions, 
social democracy performed pragmatically – and exhibited a middle class 
joy in cultivation. Both spoke to power: Nietzsche by undermining 
bourgeois idealism with vitalism; the Social Democracies by seeking to gain 
access to the middle class.”13 Nietzsche’s challenge to power, according to 
Sloterdijk, was that of the kynic: 
Nietzsche’s decisive self-characterization, often overlooked, is that 
of a “cynic” (Cyniker, with this he became, next to Marx, the most 
momentous thinker of the century. Nietzsche’s “cynicism” offers a 
modified approach to “saying the truth”: It is one of strategy and 
tactics, suspicion and disinhibition, pragmatics and 
instrumentalism – all this in the hands of a political ego that thinks 
first and foremost about itself, an ego that is inwardly and outwardly 
armored.”14 (my emphasis)  
Kynicism constantly challenges the “happy” Kantian and the “reasonable” 
mind, which is disembodied. Embodied, kynical thought, for Sloterdijk, is 
the future; to live, it must leave the cynical acceptance of a dying philosophy 
(instead of acting “as if” it is alive when it is dying): 
Physiognomic thinking offers a chance to escape from the regime of 
disembodied and therefore evil minds. To announce a new critique 
of reason means to have a philosophical physiognomy in mind; 
that is not, as with Adorno, “aesthetic theory,” but a theory of 
consciousness with flesh and blood (and teeth).15 
Sloterdijk suggests that the starting point for this new kind of thinking is not 
simply the body; it is pain: 
I believe that Critical Theory has found a provisional ego for 
critique and a “standpoint” that provides it with perspectives for a 
truly incisive critique – a standpoint that conventional 
epistemology does not consider – it is a priori pain. It is the basis of 
elevated, distanced critique that achieves grand overviews but a 
stance of extreme closeness – micrology. If things have become too 
close for comfort for us, a critique must arise that expresses this 
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discomfort. It is not a matter of proper distance but of proper 
proximity.16 
Now, critique is possible inasmuch as pain tells us what is ‘true’ and what is 
‘false’. However, there is a problem: “In the sensitive critique,” which is 
“based on a reproachful attitude, composed of suffering, contempt, and rage 
against everything that has power,” it “makes itself into a mirror of the evil 
in the world.”17 And this, argues Sloterdijk, demonstrates a “paralyzing 
resentment.”18 He calls sensitive critique a “defensive thinking” in which the 
“masochistic element has outdone the creative element.”19 Sloterdijk brings 
back Nietzsche to argue that Kynicism can balance out these two elements. It 
can give Critical Theory a new life which isn’t based, primarily, on pain and 
resentment against everything that has power. Instead of following 
Adorno’s example, “where enlightenment appears as a ‘melancholy science’ 
(Adorno – trans), it unintentionally furthers melancholic stagnation,” the 
“critique of cynical reason hopes to achieve more from a work that cheers us 
up.”20 The work that he refers to is the work of satire and cheekiness. He 
feels that Adorno has lost this Nietzschean Kynical sensibility. The question 
is whether his turn to a Nietzschean “gay science” totally displaces Adorno’s 
“melancholy science.” 
 Sloterdijk argues that history, in all its displacements, overturns 
paradigms and traditions and creates an “unhappy consciousness” that is 
germane to cynicism. Rather than just passively accept it, he suggests a more 
Nietzschean aggressive approach to keep the kynic from slipping into a 
reactionary or of even fascistic attitude. He agrees with the idea that time is 
irreversible, that we cannot go back, and that once one’s world disappears 
we can no longer be naïve. On this note, he sees the task of ideological 
critique as incomplete. Simply showing that one’s ideas are archaic, is 
ineffective. A more aggressive and joyful approach is needed if one is to 
combat power and cynicism. He turns to Diogenes– and not just Nietzsche - 
for this approach. 
 In his chapter entitled “In Search of Lost Cheekiness,” Sloterdijk takes 
Diogenes as the ultimate precursor for Nietzsche. Diogenes is a kynic, not a 
cynic: 
With Diogenes, the resistance against the rigged game of 
“discourse” begins in European philosophy. Desperately funny, he 
resists the “lingusitification” of the cosmic universalism that called 
the philosopher to his occupation…He creates satirical resistance, 
an uncivil enlightenment.21  
In Diogenes, “Greek kynicism discovers the animal body in the human and 
its gestures as arguments; it develops a pantomimic materialism. Diogenes 
refutes the language of the philosopher with that of the clown.”22 Diogenes, 
who Plato apparently calls the “mad Socrates,” doesn’t argue with his 
opponents. He mocks them and calls them name. In his “cheekiness,” the 
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“kynic farts, pisses, masturbate on the street, before the eyes of the Athenian 
market. He shows contempt for fame, ridicules the architecture, refuses 
respect, parodies the stories of gods and heroes.”23 Sloterdijjk insists that 
“only the theory of this cheekiness can open up access for the political 
history of combative reflections. This makes the history of philosophy 
possible as dialectical social history: It is the history of the embodiment and 
splitting of consciousness.”24  
 Sloterdijk, in the very same section that he describes Diogenes as a 
model, suggests that while Diogenes is the precursor for the European revolt 
against philosophy, it is “the Jewish David” who is “prototype of the 
cheeky.”25 He “teases Goliath, ‘Come here, so I can hit you better’. He shows 
that the head has not only ears to hear and obey but also a brow with which 
to menacingly defy the stronger: rebellion, affront, effrontery.”26 In doing 
this, Sloterdijk suggests that we understand Jewishness in terms of 
“cheekiness,” thereby making Diogenes and “the Jewish David” into kin. 
 Near the end of Sloterdijk’s book, “Jewish cynicism” comes up. But 
this time Sloterdijk returns to themes of “melancholy science” to explain it. 
He frames his explanation in terms of what he calls “black empiricism”: 
Black empiricism…. with a frequently justified suspicion… asks 
only which principles, which right, is power based on, but also 
which rights the powerful infringe in their exercise of power…. 
What drives this….is a political trauma: to have been exposed 
without projection to the “legitimate” but brutal, painful, 
oppressive force and violence of others – the power of parents, 
disciplinary force, power (military, police, executive) force and 
violence, sexual violence and coercion. The trauma gives birth to 
the critical attitude. It's a priori: Never again be struck; never again 
swallow offenses without resisting; never again, if possible, allow a 
hegemonic power to do violence against us. The critical stance is 
allied at its origin with Jewish kynicism against the arrogance of the 
more powerful.27 
The repeated “never again” that Sloterdijk employs (echoing Eli Weisel) 
suggests a kind of kynicism, however, that has more in common with 
melancholic science than gay science. There is no cheekiness here. However, 
Sloterdijk seems to suggest that the drive to get a confession from the 
perpetrators is: 
This critique tends toward wanting to wring from the ruling 
powerful confessions of their violence and immorality. It comes 
down to….exposure of the wolves in sheep’s clothing by the 
“humbled and insulted.”28  
Strangely enough, Sloterdijk doesn’t return to this notion of Jewish 
kynicism; but in the final chapters he alternates between history (the 
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Weimar and the raise of the Nazi party in Germany) and satire. It leaves the 
reader to wonder about how kynical efforts failed to stop Germany from 
sliding into cynicism, Nazism, and the Holocaust (which goes unmentioned 
at the end of the book).  
Sloterdijk’s gloss on Jewish Kynicism, the alluded to failure of 
cynicism, and the omission of the Holocaust are telling and provide us with 
the proper framework to address Jean Améry’s work and his neo-
Nietzschean revisions. What Sloterdijk doesn’t make clear is that the 
“cheekiness” of Jewish Kynicism is much different from what we find in the 
satirical tradition that emerged out of Diogenes. The truth of the matter is 
that while a German Jewish thinker like Heine was cheeky in his satirical 
depictions of Germans and Jews, he didn’t look to “wring from the powerful 
confessions of their violence and immorality.” That came later, after the 
Holocaust. This cheekiness is of a different sort. And one wonders whether 
it actually shows that Adorno’s “melancholy science” is more helpful in 
understanding “Jewish kynicism.” Sloterdijk suggests that it is not because it 
is too masochistic and unhappy. But how is demanding an apology “gay”? 
Isn’t it rooted in pain? Or is the demand itself, because it is unheard of, 
cheeky and “gay science”? Let’s turn to Jean Améry for an answer. Like 
Sloterdijk’s appeal to cynicism, it draws on Nietzsche as a precursor but it 
doesn’t take everything he says. 
 
Neo-Nietzschean, Take Two: Améry’s Revisionary Readings 
of Resentment, Revolt, and Jewishness  
Like Theodor Adorno, Jean Améry wonders about how and whether, after 
the constant exposure to pain, torture, and death in the concentration camps, 
modernity can turn to Enlightenment ideals. History and time, for Améry, 
are irreversible. One cannot go back to any original naiveté or innocence that 
existed before the Holocaust. What remains in its wake is a kind of cynicism 
and resentment; they run throughout Améry’s books – such as At the Mind’s 
Limits, On Aging, and Radical Humanism. Like many cynical thinkers, Améry 
realizes that, after Auschwitz, idealism and Enlightenment ideals have failed 
and cannot be fully recovered. After what he calls “the first blow” (to the 
body), Améry realizes that these same ideals failed to stop the unthinkable 
from happening. He realizes that he was naïve to think that they could. In At 
the Mind’s Limits, Améry comes to the realization and conclusion that, after 
Auschwitz, “if the intellect was not centered around a religious or political 
belief, it was of no help, or little help. It abandoned us. It constantly 
vanished from sight whenever those questions were involved that were once 
‘ultimate ones.’”29 He, at the time, could turn to neither religion nor politics; 
he was not raised as a religious Jew and wasn’t politically oriented. 
However, what he did have at his disposal was a cogent and deep 
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understanding of philosophy and literature. He saw himself and life itself 
through their prisms. But they failed: 
The reality of the camp triumphed effortlessly over death and over 
the entire complex of the so-called ultimate questions. Here, too, 
the mind came up against its limits…The axes of its traditional 
frames of references then shattered. Beauty: that was an illusion. 
Knowledge: that turned out to be a game with ideas. Death violated 
itself in all its inscriptibility.30 
In the wake of such overwhelming failure, Améry concluded, like Sloterdijk 
and Adorno, that instead of Enlightenment philosophy and modern 
literature being the fundamental starting points for understanding, critique, 
and action, physical pain, cynicism, and resentment – which emerge out of 
the mind’s failure to transcend endless suffering and death and torture and 
are based in the social – are where new thought departs and returns. He 
states this emphatically, in the last paragraph of At the Mind’s Limits:  
In my incessant effort to explore the basic condition of being a 
victim, in conflict with the necessity of being a Jew and the 
impossibility of being one, I believe to have recognized that the 
most extreme expectations and demands directed at us are of a 
physical and social nature. That such knowledge has made me unfit 
for profound and lofty speculation, I know. It is my hope that it has 
better equipped me to recognize reality.31 
While Peter Sloterdijk notes that “every critique is a pioneering work on the 
pain of the times,”32 Améry suggests that in response to the cynicism and 
resentment produced by history, a proper phenomenological description of 
historical existence – free from the naiveté that situates the mind above time 
and pain – must be articulated. Once this is done, Améry tells us that a 
decision must be made about whether and how one should act in response 
to such historical pain. This choice – because it is based on historical 
experience - is not between one idea and another. Action, as Améry and 
Sloterdijk understand it, is physically and socially conditioned and, if it is to 
be affective, it must be embodied. Moreover, action is in response to the 
irreversibility of time and physical pain.  
 Améry, like Adorno and Sloterdijk, is interested in pain as the a priori 
origin of critique. But it is also, as Nietzsche might say, the source of 
resentment (which Améry takes quite seriously and associates with the 
experience of utter hopelessness and victimhood). Améry aptly calls it – in 
particular reference to his own experience of torture and to discourse in 
general – the “first blow”: “The first blow brings home to the prisoner that 
he is helpless, and thus it already contains in the bud everything that is to 
come.”33 This experience deprives him of his dignity and the “expectation of 
help” what he calls “the fundamental experience of human beings.”34 
Améry expands on his particular experience to arrive at a generalization 
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about pain. After the first blow, everything changes and the tragedy of 
time’s irreversibly is brought to bear on the subject: “But with the first blow 
from a policeman’s fist, against which there can be no defense and which no 
helping hand will ward off, a part of our life ends and it can never be 
retrieved.”35  
 Améry tells us that violence destroys idealism. This is a far cry from 
Sloterdijk’s read on Kynicism and his appeal to “gay science.” In Améry’s 
description of torture and its transformation of man into the flesh, we see 
man as totally helpless and powerless:  
Only in torture does the transformation of the person into the flesh 
become complete. Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in pain, 
awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is 
only a body, and nothing else besides that.36 
The tortured man has no agency. He can’t be “cheeky.” Pain, for Améry, is 
the a priori, just as the body is the a priori: “Pain…is the most extreme 
intensification imaginable to our bodily being.”37 
 Building on the notion that pain marks irreversibility, Améry likens it 
to being exiled, perpetually, from home. After being tortured, one cannot 
find home. One cannot trust the world or be in it; moreover, torture is so 
great that one, apparently, doesn’t even have the desire to have revenge (in 
the Nietzschean sense). In the wake of victimization, resentment remains, 
but without any hope of revenge.38 One would think that no action in the 
wake of torture seems possible for the torture victim. Their victimization is 
so extreme that they can’t have any desire for revenge; moreover, they seem 
to be totally wordless and will remains so because they don’t feel at home in 
the world and never will. This language is extreme. 
 In a chapter devoted to resentment, Améry takes on a different tone. It 
is personal and it actually ponders the possibility of action (despite the fact 
that reversibility is impossible; and he does suggest that he has lost all desire 
as a result of torture): “I speak as a victim and examine my resentments.”39 
When reflecting on them, Améry takes note of how resentment is a historical 
and existential phenomenon.40 But even though they are a part of his history 
and, over time, will disappear (after all, as they say, time heals all wounds), 
he tells the reader something novel; namely, that he is making a decision 
about how to deal with them. In other words, he is not simply, as Nietzsche 
would say, reacting but acting: “I preserve my resentments. And since I 
neither can nor want to get rid of them, I must live with them and am 
obligated to clarify them for those against whom they are directed.”41 
Améry’s claim that he has an “obligation” to clarify them to those “against 
whom they are directed” suggests that he is looking for something from 
them. 
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 His choice to explain his resentment is also coupled with his refusal to 
walk into the future and forget about the past: “The man of resentment 
cannot join in the unisonous peace chorus all around him, which cheerfully 
proposes: not backward let us look forward, to a better, common future.”42 
In holding his resentments, he is proposing a different reading of Nietzsche 
that gives the “man of resentment” some agency. Moreover, by going 
against the grain, he is “cheeky” in a way that Diogenes is not. Unlike 
Nietzsche’s man of resentment, Améry believes that others in history will 
make the perpetrators confess and admit to their guilt. Améry lacks the 
“desire, talent, and conviction”43 but he believes that “through actualization, 
or more strongly stated, by actually settling the unresolved conflict in the 
field of historical practice”44 that he can, at least through someone else, 
experience a kind of reversibility of time:  
I want at least the vile satisfaction of knowing that my enemy is 
behind bars. Thereupon I should fancy that the contradiction of my 
madly twisted time-sense (that is, his sense of irreversibility and 
perpetual powerlessness) were resolved.45 
Améry calls this a “revolt against reality” a “moral solidarity” with others 
who are also men of resentment. He hopes that his resentment can “perform 
a historical function.”46 But near the end of the book, he admits that he bears 
his grudge “for reasons of personal salvation.”47 Here resentment – contrary 
to Nietzsche – is active because it may also be “for the good of the German 
people.”48  
 Améry suggests, like Sloterdijk, a new kind of Jewishness which, in 
some ways, is kynical because it draws on resentment to strike back: 
Our resentments – emotional source of every genuine morality, 
which was always the morality of the losers – have little or no 
chance at all to make the evil work of the overwhelmers bitter for 
them.49  
But this is the irony. Nietzsche’s extreme reactions to Slave Morality show 
that it actually did make it bitter for those in power for centuries. In effect, 
Améry is taking on an active form of Slave Morality because he is directly 
making the oppressor bitter, and, as Sloterdijk would say, confess their guilt.  
 In the final section of the book, Améry embraces his Jewish 
particularity but he does so through this kind of revolt against the biological 
passing of time and forgetfulness. Unlike Nietzsche, he doesn't embrace 
“active forgetfulness”: “I became a person not by subjectively appealing to 
my abstract humanity, but by discovering myself within the given social 
reality as a revolting Jew and by realizing myself as one.”50 He is, in at least 
one sense posited by Sloterdijk, a kynical Jew. But he gives this term much 
more meaning than Sloterdijk. 
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 While Améry’s kynicism and his nuanced readings of resentment, 
Jewishness, time, and revolt in At the Mind’s Limits (1966) seem to state his 
final words on resentment, his book On Aging, which he wrote only two 
years later (1968), suggests conclusions about resentment, history, and action 
which are at odds with his 1968 text. Although Améry doesn’t address the 
Holocaust or torture in that book, he does address the irreversibility of time 
and the possibly of revolt. This book, when read against At the Mind’s Limits, 
suggests that not all people can act or affect the world. At a certain point, the 
aging are less concerned with the world and more concerned with the 
body’s pain. They live with resentment and alienation but can’t do anything 
about it. Revolt is out of the question. From this book, we learn that only a 
being who is young can affect history and revolt against it. The aging 
cannot.  
  Playing on Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, Améry 
suggests that narrator of his book cannot naively believe in the lies he or she 
may posit about the power of memory. The time of the narrator – the time 
posited by fiction - is not real. Time can only be redeemed in literature. In 
real life it cannot: “It is time, lived time, or if you will, subjective time, which 
is our most urgent problem.”51 Speaking as an author and a person, Améry 
tells the reader that “time is our arch enemy and our most intimate 
friend…our pain and our hope.”52 Améry contrasts the literary narrator 
(who he calls “A”) to a physicist (who he calls “B”).53 Who is right? Is time – 
by way of memory – reversible or is it – by virtue of necessity – irreversible? 
Based on the experience of aging, Améry argues that the physicist is right 
and the writer is wrong: “The time of which we become aware in aging is 
not only something we cannot grasp; it is also filled with absurdity, a bitter 
mockery of every intellectual precision we have aspired to.”54 Only the 
young can expect things in the future.55 The aging can only expect more pain 
and death.56  
 When one ages one “doesn’t exactly believe anymore in the world and 
what’s in store for him.”57 As the world fades, time goes inside of our 
bodies.58 In contrast, for the young “time…movers in space.”59 The world is 
open to the young. The old experience the negation of space: “For what once 
was world, was space, but not it is only time.”60  
Only the aging, who all at once know how to count the autumns 
and the winters with horrifying exactness, since they still measure 
seasons against those that have passed and gone into them, 
understand the passage of time as an irreversibility – too horrible to 
complain about, since so much has slipped by and already run 
past.61  
Améry’s judgment is harsh: Irreversibility cannot be reversed through 
memory or literature.62 For the aging, as opposed to the narrator in his 
novel, the “feeling (of lost time) is constantly present within them – and not 
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only because of the diminishing power of their bodies or the increasing 
sufferings these bodies cause them – that they carry time insides themselves 
and therefore do not even need to realize the past in their memory.”63 
 While Améry talks about the “first blow” by torture or violence in At 
the Mind’s Limits as ever-present, he knows it can be reversed or revolted 
against by way of history and confession of guilt; here he suggests that aging 
and the receding world cannot be revolted against. The “body’s blemishes” 
take one out of the world.64 There is no space for the aging, only time. One 
degenerates and becomes smaller.65 One becomes a thing.66 For Améry, this 
happens when the world you lived in no longer exists. World and time are 
the ultimate judges.  
 In all of this, Améry, never speaks of solidarity or revolt. He comes to 
the conclusion that one can and must resign oneself to irreversibility at a 
certain point of one’s life. One is alone and powerless. Here, his reading of 
aging is wholly cynical and not kynical. There is nothing cheeky in this book 
save for his renunciation of Proust and the possibility of literature. This 
cynicism contradicts what we find in At the Mind’s Limits. 
 
Wyschogrod: Against Nietzsche, Against Resentment 
Contrasting Améry’s different readings of irreversibility, the body, and 
resentment – which are informed in some way by Nietzsche’s and echo 
Sloterdijk’s - to Edith Wyschogrod’s reading of the Saint and her body, we 
find that there is a fundamental contrast between the cynic and the saint. 
This difference has a lot to do with how the Saint’s body differs from the 
Nietzschean, kynical body. Moreover, it has to do with a different take on 
altruism, resentment, and irreversibility.  
Wyschogrod’s reading of the Saint draws on Emmanuel Levinas so as 
to present a challenge to Nietzsche’s take on resentment and the body. 
Levinas’s take on sensibility is the basis for her reading of the Saint’s 
vulnerability. “Sensation is affective rather than reactive; moreover, it is 
recoverable.67 
According to Wyschogrod, citing Levinas, there is a “temporal 
difference, but it is time in which nothing is lost.” Because the sense 
impression involves a recovery of time, it is still temporalized through the 
time scheme of presence.”68 And it is this “affective side of sensation” which 
“can be experienced as pure vulnerability: what is other than the self can 
affect the self through pain or wounding.”69 Although this “dimension of 
corporeal existence is common to all,” Wyschogrod argues that Saints, 
because they pose “no obstacle to experiencing this vulnerability, permit it 
to acquire primacy in their lives.”70 The cynic, on the contrary, would not 
permit this to happen. Like the victim of torture, but unlike Améry’s kynical 
M e n a c h e m  F e u e r  |  1 0 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.789 
Jewish subject in The Mind at the Limits, “the saint is without defenses, 
unsheltered, exposed to insult and outrage.”71 
 Wyschogrod is cognizant of what this suggests and notes that “such 
denuding of the self’s form, such stripping it of empowerment, would 
appear to leave the self open to the violence and aggression of others.”72 
And “this by no means precludes that defenselessness will not be met by 
aggression. To the contrary: violence is a frequent response to vulnerability 
and constitutes the first of saintly life.”73 The Saint’s vulnerability is a 
response to the “other’s destitution,” but “saints are not masochistic to 
derive satisfaction in suffering.”74 It is, rather, the “need and lack of the 
Other, not pleasure in the experience of pain, that constitutes the appeal of 
the saint and authorizes or provides the warranty for saintly activity in the 
everyday world.”75 By putting it this way, Wyschogrod suggests that the 
Saint has no personal motive or satisfaction in being vulnerable. She is for-
the-other.  
 The time of being for the other is irreversible: “When it is bound up 
with the Other, time imprints itself on the pain and suffering the enucleated 
self accepts in the interest of the Other. Time that impresses itself in this way 
does not come to fruition in pain so that pain is the culmination of...time.... 
time throbs without ceasing.”76 This time is “irrecoverable” and is not the 
culmination of the kind of work that is “self-empowering”. It is 
“renunciation of power” that, in aging while waiting for the other, there is a 
passing of time that is not recoverable. Its irreversibility is for the other, not 
the self. Unlike Améry, this is not tragic for the aging self because it is 
waiting for the other. 
 After making this case for Saintly time and vulnerability, Wyschogrod 
takes up “Nietzsche’s objections” to altruism and in doing so she addresses 
resentment, the body, and his notion of irreversibly that go hand-in-hand 
with cynicism and, as I would argue, cynicism: “Altruism has historically 
been rooted in affect, in compassion or pity for the other.”77 Wyschogrod 
cites Aristotle to support this view that the pity is expressed in the face of 
the other’s misfortune: “on this view, if I pity the other I must see the other 
as blameless so that the other’s suffering cannot be attributed to a self-
generated error or moral failing.”78 In contrast to this, Nietzsche cynically 
suspects pity: “on his view, pity is the emotion that is felt when the desire 
for revenge is suppressed.79 As Wyschogrod underscores, Nietzsche favors 
vengeance over resentment: 
If someone injures me, I may strike back directly or I may delay my 
response. When I strike back, I spontaneously discharge my 
vengeful feeling so that it no longer acts upon my psychological 
life, but when weakness or fear prevents this direct discharge of 
affect, my frustrated rage turns into resentment. Pity is the fruit of 
this emotion.80  
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Wyschogrod cites Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals so as to point out how 
diametrically opposed the Saint is to Nietzsche’s subject: “’Impotence which 
cannot retaliate,’ Nietzsche declares, ‘is turned into kindness, pusillanimity 
and humility’” (Genealogy of Morals, I, 14). As I noted above, Nietzsche thinks 
this “impotence” is unhealthy. For him, this “instinctual degeneration”81 
goes hand in hand with “the excessive development of consciousness and 
the hypertrophy of reason.”82 And “as a result of both inner and institutional 
repression, a new human type is created, the man of ressentiment.”83  
 In response to Nietzsche’s reading, Wyschogrod brings up two 
“counterarguments.” One by Max Scheler, the other by Gilles Deleuze. 
However, as she notes, while the former gives a direct criticism of 
resentment, the latter does so indirectly in his analysis of “reactive forces.” 
She finds both counterarguments to be weak.84 Wyschogrod suggests that, 
by taking a closer look at “Nietzsche’s notion of life” we can “elicit some 
presuppositions bound up with Nietzsche’s vitalism that will clear the way 
for a fresh interpretation of Saintly compassion and pity.”85 Wyschogrod 
cites the urgency of this appeal by noting how Sloterdijk carries Nietzsche’s 
notions of resentment and pity into his own work.86 Although she doesn’t 
explain why this is the case, she takes note of how Nietzsche’s reading of the 
body enters into postmodern discourse.  
 Wyschogrod, in her effort to “elicit some presuppositions bound up 
with Nietzsche’s vitalism,” points out that, for Nietzsche “the joy of 
becoming is a corporeal joy” and the “will to power” is “nothing less than 
the body’s self-expression as force.”87 Based on this, she argues that his 
reading of the body is to narrowly conceived: 
It can be argued against Nietzsche that he has given the body too 
narrow an interpretation. His account cordons off a feature of the 
corporeality that is intrinsic to it: the body’s vulnerably. To be as 
embodied existence, as flesh, is to be vulnerable. This is not a 
property of diseased bodies but of bodies generally. While 
Nietzsche acknowledges and even celebrates death, he segregates 
the phenomenon of vulnerability – sensitivity to temperature, 
fatigue, exhaustion, sleep, the like – from death itself.”88 
Building on this point, Wyschogrod points out that Nietzsche’s body is 
perpetually vigilant and wakeful. Nietzsche’s take on the body’s 
wakefulness “refuses to acknowledged the body’s slackness exhibited by 
phenomena such as fatigue and sleep.”89 And because there is such a 
perpetual awareness of vitality, there is no room for memory since all affect 
is immediate; there is no temporal delay that would inform memory.90 The 
only memory he cherishes, as I pointed out above, is the “memory of the 
will” which, as Wyschogrod points out “refuses to become slack.”91  
 Wyschogrod acknowledges that while her reading of the body, in 
contrast to Nietzsche’s, poses a strong objection, it still doesn’t get at the 
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“origin of resentment.” Wyschogrod comes up with three questions that 
address this problem: “Is there something in the character of existence itself 
that Nietzsche sees as bringing the “spirit of revenge” into being? If so, can 
the spirit of revenge by overcome? And, if Nietzsche thinks it can, how does 
his view affect the view of saintliness I have proposed together with the 
notion of time integral to it?”92 The main enemy for Nietzsche and the origin 
of resentment is time’s passing: the “it was”. Wyschogrod focuses on the 
vitalist response to this rather than the literary/mythological response. As 
Wyschogrod points out, the “irreversibility of time entails the will’s inability 
to will backward….under the inexorable pressure of time, the will sees itself 
as responsible for its helplessness before time’s directionality and 
superimposes a burden of guilt upon a prior condition of existence.”93 
 Nietzsche was acutely aware of and wrote frequently of time’s 
irreversibility and “develops a phenomenology of time as physiological, 
cosmological, and cultural aging as well as of historical irreversibility.” He 
“superimposed on this construal of time…a notion of the power of human 
agency to trick time as it were while still retaining the truth of time’s 
irreversibility and the innocence of becoming.”94 And this is the main point 
for Wyschogrod, Nietzsche’s conception of the body and the origin of 
resentment both entail a reading of the body and time in a cynical manner.  
 Wyschogrod juxtaposes this to the Saint’s take on the body and 
irreversibility. As I noted above, it is the other’s pain and the time lost in 
attending to it that is irreversible. She calls this “dark diachronicty.”95 
Drawing on trauma (and reminiscent of what Améry calls the “first blow” 
and the experience of aging), Wyschogrod points out how unique moments 
in life are irrecoverable but color our experiences.96 Although this kind or 
unique time cannot be regained and is irreversible, she asks if “there is any 
way of annulling the past or negating the future that takes time’s dark 
diachrnonicity into account, that respects both the newness of experience 
and the irrecoverabillty of time?” The answer, for Wyschogrod, is yes: 
“Repentance and apology, pardon, and forgiveness are phenomenon that 
erase the past while maintaining time’s irreversibility.”97 In other words, the 
key difference between the cynic and the saint has to do with how we read 
irreversibility and the body in relation to the social dimension: 
In repentance the process is reversed not because the will wills 
backward in Nietzsche’s sense but because the offence created by 
acts against the Other is undone so that the offense no longer exits. 
Unlike repentance, apology and forgiveness are social acts in which 
the undoing of the past offense requires reciprocity: the Other must 
be complicit in granting pardon.98 
 
 
1 1 2  |  T h e  S a i n t  a n d  t h e  C y n i c  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.789 
Conclusion 
Wyschogrod’s formulation suggests a framework that can be used in 
relation to understanding Améry’s desire to see the “Germans behind bars” 
and admitting to their wrongdoing. While, as I have noted above, Améry in 
On Aging, is acutely aware of time’s irreversibility and thinks that, for the 
aging, nothing can be done to battle against time and social alienation, he 
does allow for some kind of reversibility in At the Mind’s Limits. He 
acknowledges that he will not be the same, physiologically, after the first 
blow. But this social admission does make him feel better. To be sure, 
Améry’s desire for “personal salvation” is motivated by holding close to and 
acting on his resentments and taking historical action. It is based on a 
“revolt” against time’s irreversibility. But that doesn’t make him a Saint. He 
is, as Sloterdijk would say, a Jewish kynic. He sees the root of his desire to 
react in his neo-Nietzschean reading of the body, pain, and time. The most 
important thing, it seems, is to remain strong. And this is found in his 
affirmation of Zionism. As he notes in his essay “Being a Jew” Jewishness 
changed after the Holocaust: 
They beat us when it pleased them…. They may have been 
destined to be slaves of the master race; but we were signed over to 
death. It reached the point where we Jews allowed ourselves to be 
beaten without resistance. Only once did I strike back, in the 
mistaken belief that in this way I could retain my human dignity. 
Then I recognized that it made no sense. The Jew was the sacrificial 
animal…. To be sure I had not acquired Judaism in the sense of 
historical tradition and a positive existential foundation of life. The 
only thing that binds me positively to the majority of Jews in the 
world is a solidarity with the State of Israel….For me, solidary with 
Israel means keeping faith with my dead comrades.99  
While Améry doesn’t pardon or forgive the Nazis for what they did, he does 
allow for social redress. But that seems to be less important for him than 
making sure that Jews are no longer deemed a “sacrificial animal.” This 
desire is more rooted in a Nietzschean sense of the body and power. It tends 
more to the cynic than the saint. The State of Israel puts the Jewish people 
into the realm of history and power from which they were, over history, 
excluded. It marks a new beginning and a different kind of Jewishness that 
is more kynical. 
However, we can’t forget that Améry wrote On Aging two years after 
he wrote At the Mind’s Limits. Although he sees himself in solidarity with 
other Jews and Israel and although he believed that social admission of 
wrongs against Jews was important and put Jews into a better historical 
position than they had in the past (after all, Jews never asked any nation for 
admission of guilt once it went into exile), he ultimately thought of himself 
as an individual alienated from the world and subject to aging, pain, 
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vulnerability, and time’s irreversibility. His body, as he notes in On Aging, 
was his main concern as he aged, not the world. This articulates a kind of 
cynicism because it is an admission that, in contrast to the saint, my time 
will not be lost in waiting for the other or attending to the other. In On 
Aging, Améry is telling his reader that his time and his resentment have to 
do with his pain, his death, and his wordlessness, and nothing can reverse 
that. On a final note, I suggest that we read this book against the other books 
and essays because, in doing so, we can see that although there is a tension 
in Améry’s work between the cynic and the saint, in the end the vigilant 
Nietzschean body fails. Améry insists, there, that irreversible time cannot be 
redeemed either through memory, willing, sarcasm, or history. But if I start 
with the other’s pain and resentments rather than my own, that need not be 
the case because then the time I lose is lost for someone else. That’s another 
story which, perhaps, may never be seen on the stage of history yet, 
nonetheless, happens every day when, despite our age, this or that saint 
attends to the suffering. 
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